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Disciplining the practice of creative enquiry: the 
suppression of difference in teacher education 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we suggest that the pursuit of ahistorical, universal truths in education is antithetical to 
creativity, learning and motivation in preservice teachers. We argue that learning to teach is a dynamic 
process embedded in networks of power in which educational truths are politically accomplished 
rather than innocently discovered. We identify regulatory discourses in education which we believe 
encourage conservatism through claims to ground practice in apolitical notions such as ‘best practice’, 
scientific evidence or ahistorical reason.  We claim that these are merely attempts to privilege or 
naturalise existing configurations of power and knowledge. Furthermore, we claim that such 
disciplining encourages a dependency and inflexibility in new teachers since it claims to absolve them 
of their responsibility for judgements made in the teaching moment.  We draw upon examples from 
our own research to illustrate how such discursive mechanisms serve to foreclose students’ creativity 
and argue that inventiveness cannot occur through rational enquiry alone. We suggest instead that 
competing discourses of teacher identity and practice are required for change and that this calls for a 
culture in teacher education wherein students’ courage to act on conviction and undertake creative 
enquiry is valued.  
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Disciplining the practice of creative enquiry: the 
suppression of difference in teacher education 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we argue that the hope of an unambiguous, settled solution to the problem of teacher 
education is a chimera. We do not however intend this to suggest pessimism. On the contrary, we 
suggest that the absence of such certainty is productive whereas the pursuit of certainty is antithetical 
to student teachers’ learning. The problem of education has perplexed philosophers and educationists 
alike for centuries and as Kant lamented, the art of education and the art of politics are infuriatingly 
difficult to define let alone undertake.1  They continue to be so in contemporary times. A period of 
political, economic and philosophical uncertainty has ushered in a wave of anxiety about the 
professional learning of teachers (Britzman, 2003; Edwards et al, 2002; Furlong, 2000).  On the one 
hand, we find teacher education cloaked in state-mandated standardisation. On the other, we note an 
increasing proclivity for the different, the transgressive and the local. Whilst we are encouraged by the 
educational potential of the latter, we are disheartened by the former development. For in what 
follows, we argue that learning to teach is inevitably a dynamic practice embedded in networks of 
power and that claims to have depoliticised this process are merely attempts to preserve practice and to 
privilege - that is to naturalise - existing configurations of power. 
In claiming that the pursuit of certainty regulates students’ learning and conduct is also to claim that it 
regulates their identity2.  When we speak of ‘learning’ here we do not refer merely to that which we 
know in our supposedly ‘disembodied’ minds; rather, learning shapes the way we are, the practices we 
enact, the values and beliefs to which we ascribe (Paechter et al, 2001). This is a dynamic, social 
process which involves both being shaped by and shaping institutional norms and discourses. Learning 
constructs self and social identities through the various social positions inhabited (Cole, 1996; 
Dillabough, 1999; Samuel & Stephens, 2000). Social performances are influenced by the tools 
available for identity construction but social interactions nevertheless constitute its ongoing renewal. 
Viewed this way, professional identity construction is a process of struggle infused in relations of 
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power (see for example, Britzman, 2003; Buendia, 2000; Johnson, 1997; Phillips, 2001; Roberts, 
2000; Samuel & Stephens, 2000; Volkmann & Anderson, 1998 and Goodson & Cole, 1994).  
As well as claiming that pre-service teachers’ identities and practices are regulated by the pursuit of 
certainty, we also identify in this paper the particular discursive, regulatory mechanisms at work, and 
examine how these serve to suppress the development of creative pedagogy. One mechanism we 
identify is Initial Teacher Training (ITT) policy in England, which underwent significant reform in the 
1990s. The Professional Standards For Qualified Teacher Status (TTA, 2003) purport to offer 
definitive, measurable outcomes for student teachers’ learning. Yet such standards are not innocent. A 
standards based teacher education system relies upon assumptions and commitments which need to be 
made explicit in order that they may be critically evaluated (Beyer, 2002). This paper traces the 
philosophical assumptions and values underpinning a standards model to technicism and argues that 
such prescriptions hinder creative thought and action in student teachers. A further mechanism of 
regulation we identify is the persistence in education of a belief in an objective, transcendent 
rationality, the assumption that there is a neutral vantage point from which student teachers, by 
submitting to the technology of reason and logic, may discern order, laws and clarity across teaching 
dilemmas within particular contexts.3 Such beliefs inhere in some versions of the reflective 
practitioner movement.  
These discursive, regulatory mechanisms privilege an appeal to evidence, objectivity, the market 
and/or reason and we argue that by doing so they suppress the generative potential of power and 
difference in education. Most disturbing of all is that, in declaring themselves as fail-safe ‘rule-books’ 
for pedagogical practice, we suggest that such foundationalist discourses deny student teachers the 
responsibility and conviction necessary for contesting and thus for (re)fashioning teaching practice.  
We begin first with an examination of the crisis of teacher professionalism and we link this to the 
broader ‘knowledge crisis’ of which it is a part. Having discussed the relation between knowledge, 
practice and power, we then go on to discuss in detail the discursive mechanisms we believe suppress 
creativity in teacher education. Finally, we draw on examples from our own research to illustrate how 
such mechanisms served to foreclose our own students’ creativity and learning.  
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The crisis in teacher education 
The crisis in teacher education is associated with two significant and interrelated changes. The first is 
the transformation of teachers’ working conditions and professional culture in recent decades. This has 
contributed to low morale and, for some primary teachers, even a desire to leave the profession (NCE, 
1993). Whilst there may be improvements in educational effectiveness measured in terms of test 
scores, and whilst new teachers may start out with high motivation, they suffer increasing disaffection 
and low self-efficacy arising from feelings of restricted possibilities in terms of their role and their 
moral or educational purpose (Farber, 1991). 
The second change relates to a crisis within professionalism more generally, characterised as an 
inability to define the exact criteria by which to measure the ‘good teacher’ (Furlong, 2000). Teacher 
professionalism has traditionally embodied two criteria; a teacher must have mastery of specialist 
knowledge and skills together with the autonomy to apply these according to their professional 
judgement (Edwards et al, 2002). However, the absence of definitive standards in teacher education 
comparable to other professions (such as medicine or architecture for example) has been increasingly 
targeted as a cause of educational ineffectiveness. This eventually contributed to the decision to 
introduce national standards for teacher education in the 1990s (Beyer, 2002). Such standards, as 
Beyer (2002) argues, constitute authoritative, final rubrics detailing the performances, knowledge and 
dispositions with which student teachers must comply.  
Yet, as Edwards et al (2002) suggest, this ‘standards’ model of professionalism (and the behaviourist 
model of learning upon which it rests) - whilst appearing to offer a reassuring remedy for the malaise 
of uncertainty - has long been philosophically discredited. Such critiques are found in post-
structuralism, interpretivism, hermeneutics, pragmatism, the sociology of knowledge, social 
constructionism and the philosophy of science4 and they offer a devastating challenge to the notion of 
teacher professionalism as the straightforward application of a body scientifically-tested objective 
knowledge and models to local cases. In other words, after what has been referred to as the 
‘discursive’ or ‘cultural turn’ in the human and social sciences, knowledge can no longer be divorced 
from power (Hall, 1997). On the contrary, power is necessary to the production of knowledge, as truth 
and meaning are struggled over, contested and fashioned in cultural sites of action. Since this includes 
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the pedagogical knowledge of pre-service and inservice teachers, it is an understanding of this 
relationship between knowledge, practice and power to which we now turn.  
 
The crisis of representation: knowledge, practice and power 
In Lyotard’s analysis of the postmodern condition of ‘doubt’ (Lyotard, 1984), he speaks of a growing 
‘incredulity’ towards the metaphysical assumption of naïve realism, the belief that a knowable, static 
world ‘out there’, independent of our minds, perceptions and language, can supply universal, 
unchanging standards of correctness for our knowledge.5  This shift, or crisis of which he speaks leads 
us to conclude that professional knowledge cannot be thought of as propositional and apolitical – as 
words describing what classroom reality is like. Following Wittgenstein and Dewey, meaning resides 
not in objects of the world ‘in themselves’ to then be innocently discovered by us; rather it is only our 
use of things which furnish them with meaning: 
Things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon, enjoyed and endured, even more than 
things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized (Dewey, 1925, 
p.28).  
 
Thus, as Foucault (1980) would also insist, we cannot first establish an accurate description of the 
world (or the classroom) as it is and then prescribe what to do on this basis. Rather, it is necessarily the 
political act of engagement in culture which makes meaning possible. Meaning for an individual is 
dependent upon the purposes, criteria and conventions operating within a particular social community 
of practice (Wittgenstein, 1969; Fish, 1989). As Feyerabend suggests: 
Gaining knowledge, according to this account, is a process that involves a teacher, a pupil 
and a (social) situation shared by both; the result, knowledge, can only be understood by 
those who participate in it. Written notes aid them in remembering the stages of 
participation. Being incapable of replacing the process, they are useless for outsiders 
(Feyerabend, 1987, p.110). 
 
Thus the search for formal propositions which innocently capture and describe the reality must be 
abandoned. Moreover, as Biesta and Burbules’ (2003) example below suggests, meanings or ‘realities’ 
may thus clash and compete, depending upon the cultural practices at play in any situation: 
This first of all means that everyone’s experience is equally real. The horse trader, the 
jockey, the zoologist, and the palaeontologist will have their own experience of a horse 
(Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.43). 
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Foucault’s concept of ‘discourse’ is useful here, for it also attempts to overcome the distinction 
between what we say and what we do (Foucault, 1980). Discourses, on his view, are formations of 
ideas and practices associated with particular social activities and institutions within specific historical 
and cultural locations. This constructionist perspective does not therefore claim that meaning is 
subjective. Rather, it is related to communities of practice, the socially-constituted purposes of which 
render experience meaningful through the bestowal of aims, criterion of relevance, conventions and so 
on (Fish, 1989). A tacit, unwritten ‘cultural covenant’ regulates the meanings made (Hall, 1997). 
Discourses thus inscribe relations of power and operate as systems through their conceptual relations 
and categorical distinctions. This is not to suggest, however, that traditions such as education are 
entirely conservative. As well as regulating what can be said or done about teaching in educational 
institutions and what cannot, power is also productive. The sites of meaning construction are those 
very rituals and social practices of classrooms, since meaning is constituted by teachers rather than 
‘found’ by them. Knowledge continuously evolves in action and there is potential for both conflict and 
intersubjectivity wherein purposes, meanings and conventions are negotiated or reinscribed – indeed 
newly created - over time. 
If it is the case that discursive formations define teaching practices, regulate conduct and construct 
identities, then the search for neutral, ahistorical or certain foundations for teaching standards is futile. 
If learning to teach is fashioned through political struggle, can there be justification for imposing one, 
allegedly objective account of teaching and learning upon student teachers? Whose account would this 
be? Such questions are troubling, for they force us to acknowledge that because knowledge is 
contextual and contingent, we are all ethically answerable for what we do. Without a foolproof, rule-
book of absolute foundations to free teachers from the burden of uncertainty, teaching solutions are 
conditional, complex, moral judgements. Nevertheless, rather than come to terms with this 
uncomfortable conclusion, some models of teacher education have claimed to offer more secure 
foundations. It is the first of these to which we now turn, a model which claims to base teaching upon 
the foundations of ‘hard evidence’.  
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Technical rationalist models of teacher development: positivism  
The technical-rationalist account of teacher development stands accused of offering a view of reality 
as fixed and thus, the purpose of teacher education as the delivery of fixed competencies, skills and 
knowledge which teachers as ‘operatives’ then apply. Parker (1997) for example, describes how 
technical-rationalism, embedded within the philosophy of positivism and the metaphysical 
assumptions of naïve realism, has influenced various models of teacher development. He argues that 
such models constitute teacher training rather than teacher education in that the ends are pre-specified. 
Teacher professionalism, on this view, requires a general consensus regarding the ends of education 
and results in a theory-practice divide wherein the disciplinary knowledge of sociology, psychology, 
philosophy and history provided by university teacher-education departments can be transmitted to 
student teachers as techniques to guide professional practice aimed at the achievement of pre-specified 
ends.6 Learning to teach requires the technical acquisition of a set of procedures which can be 
measured as a set of behaviours applicable to any pedagogical context. The explanation of social 
phenomena must employ the experimental, inductive procedures and justificatory standards of the 
natural sciences to arrive at universal laws governing the causal relations of social phenomena (Parker, 
1997). Appeals to these laws offer an escape from spatio-historical contingency and political 
complexity through their ability to predict and control teaching and learning. The assumption is that 
scientific theory, founded upon reliable evidence, can be confidently applied to the complex social 
world of practice.  
Technical-rationalism is not without its detractors (Furlong, 2005; Popkewitz, 1987; Carr & Kemmis, 
1986; Parker, 1997). Furlong notes that technical-rationalism in education “creates the impression of 
disinterestedness and objectivity. It implies there is a common framework for people with fixed goals” 
(Furlong, 2005, p.127). He and other critics would object that this is not possible. For if meaning is 
constituted through political action within discursive formations, teachers’ different experiences, 
values and assumptions about the purpose of education will inevitably frame teaching competencies, 
theory or knowledge differently. This disagreement between technical rationalism and its detractors 
originates in the incommensurable epistemological premises from which adherents on either side of 
the dispute begin. It is a quarrel between the representationalists and the constructionists. According to 
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Parker (1997), the ‘reflective practitioner’ movement, influenced in part by critical theory, emerged 
out of this dispute as a critique of technical-rationalism.  
 
Critical Theory and teachers as researchers 
The ‘reflective practitioner’ movement contends that the education of teachers can be realised neither 
through the delivery of a pedagogical blueprint of techniques, nor through the disinterested delivery of 
disciplinary knowledge. Practical reasoning cannot be the application of prescriptions which logically 
derive from general maxims, for the very significance and thus the meaning of these terms are 
interpreted within, and thus arise out of their use in intentional action within highly particularised 
conditions. Such approaches reject means-end, positivist rationality and ‘routine action’ and require 
instead that teachers submit their practice to the test of rational interrogation (Parker, 1997). This 
approach embraces the contextual contingency of classrooms and the ecological validity of teacher 
research whilst eschewing positivist generalising about practice (Winter, 1989; Elliot, 1991). Parker 
(1997) traces the philosophical roots of rationalist approaches to the Enlightenment tradition of 
Critical Theory (Habermas, 1990), the critical pedagogies of Freire (1972), Schon (1983) and Giroux 
(1997), and the critical thinking tradition of Ennis (1996), Paul (1990) and Lipman (2003).  On this 
view, the ends and means of education are rationally interrogated by the reflective practitioner and this 
informs his or her examination of situated practice.  The teacher reflexively assesses their context in 
order to continuously (re)construct pedagogical ends and means in a dialectical relationship (Parker, 
1997). Practice is ultimately answerable to reason and evidence. 
However, reflective teaching nonetheless claims to depoliticise the construction of meaning through 
the deployment of reason. Founding decisions ultimately upon rationality, it seemingly purports to 
create a power vacuum which can liberate teachers from the burden of uncertainty and ethical 
judgement. Moreover, in assuming a ‘core, essential self’ which can stand outside discourse, it aims to 
emancipate teachers from ideology, habit or tradition. Yet, as Tabachnick and Zeichner (1991) 
contend, the meaning of ‘reflective practice’ is necessarily framed by a student teacher’s, policy-
maker’s or researcher’s intentions which are in turn framed within particular discourses. Therefore, its 
meaning cannot be cleansed of bias or values; rather, ideology is necessary for its meaning.  
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This has led to an unhappy situation for the reflective practitioner movement. The purpose of 
education is currently fiercely contested following what Woods and Jeffrey (2004) describe as the 
‘restructuring of education’. Teacher education and education more generally has been reframed in 
recent years within the ‘new managerialism’ and policy context of public accountability, through what 
Cope & I’Anson (2003) call a ‘discursive restructuring’ towards market logic and the values of 
productivity and performativity. For Lyotard (1984), the ascendancy of the ‘new right’ has come about 
through the State’s ability to reframe education within the discourse of neoliberal marketisation, with a 
turning towards the scientific assumptions of technical-rationalism for legitimacy. An era of 
intensified global competition has led to more centralised control over education and increased 
rationalisation. There is now an imposed curriculum and standardised assessment measures through 
which efficiency is prioritised as the primary moral purpose in the quest for controlled progress. In the 
context of teacher education, this led to the government reforms which introduced uniform standards 
for qualified teacher status in England and other industrialised nations (Beyer, 2002). Thus, on the one 
hand, student teachers are encouraged to construct their own pedagogical expertise through ‘reflective 
practice’ and ‘action research’, but on the other, the assumption is that ‘effectiveness’ is measured 
only in terms of performance in league-tables and National Curriculum indicators. This odd state of 
affairs appears to deny that the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ arises only through its instantiation in 
practice. It denies that what one actor in their context may perceive as excellence, another socio-
politically positioned actor may view as mediocrity or even failure. Rendered unintelligible through 
their disconnectedness from a meaningful context, critics such as Cook (2001) charge that such terms 
are rhetorically employed by those who seek to enforce their own interpretations of them and 
legitimise educational structures which prioritise a centralised curriculum delivery model of education, 
a model which others argue merely operate to maintain existing structural and educational inequality.7 
Thus, even though there is official policy endorsement of reflective practice (TTA, 2003), educational 
ends are nevertheless fixed and teachers are subject to the principle of performativity, whereby their 
worth is to be measured in terms of their ability to demonstrate efficiency in optimising given outputs. 
The aim is to define ‘best practice’ scientifically and impose it through performance-related schemes. 
In other words, there is a current danger that reflective teaching is viewed only within the framework 
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of a technical-rationalist, positivist paradigm, the very paradigm from which the reflective practice 
movement claimed to offer emancipation.  
Carr and Kemmis (1997) attempt to overcome this impasse by acknowledging this reframing. They 
suggest that those who reject quasi-market logic render ‘standards’ meaningful within a distinct notion 
of reflective practice which can stand as an alternative. Their model of critical action research aims to 
cultivate the emancipation, critical rationality and autonomy of teachers through explicit reflection 
upon the broader social, economic and political context as a means to transform education and address 
injustice. Yet nonetheless, the foundation upon which this view rests is that of reason and rational 
discourse as a means to enlighten and emancipate teachers from the distortion of hegemonic ideology. 
Again, the difficulty here is this bold claim for transcendent rationality as a means to liberate teachers 
from ideological ‘distortion’ (Parker, 1997). For it is only the values and practices of particular 
circumstances which render terms meaningful (Fish, 1989). ‘Best practice’ is a political term requiring 
qualification in concrete circumstances. Reason cannot elevate teachers above history and culture to a 
transcendent state of autonomy and absolute truth for they cannot stand apart from their historically 
and locally constituted intentions and practices.  
Such professed alternatives to positivism thus act as a conservative force on educational enquiry rather 
than as a means of its development (Thomas, 1998; Parker, 1997). This is because reflective teaching 
relies upon the empiricist assumption that an established pedagogical theory should only be refuted by 
the evidence – the ‘facts’ available to reasoned reflection in and on practice.  That is, the student 
teacher or teacher must test their theory against the reality of practice, demonstrating intellectual 
integrity and submitting to the results of reason. This assumption, however, presumes empirical ‘facts’ 
exist independent of a theory - that perception of classroom evidential facts can be theory-free8. This 
commitment to reason assumes a non-partisan, transcendental standpoint from which one may survey 
competing claims about reality and empirical ‘facts’ (Scheurich, 1997; Fish, 1989). This supposition 
thus betrays the reflective practice movement’s original assent to the sociohistorically situated nature 
of a teacher’s perception and reason. Reason cannot provide an escape from partisanship. Values 
cannot be separated from knowledge, because beliefs are not what we think about but what we think 
with (Fish1989; Graff, 2004; Olson & Worsham, 2004). Reason is not in opposition to belief but is 
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dependent upon it; thus ‘empirical evidence from outside’ is not a challenge to beliefs but is itself 
interpreted within a framework and thus acts as support for the convictions and beliefs from which 
reason emerges: 
People ‘understand’ or are ‘persuaded’ by a position or belief because it fits into a 
preexisting belief structure. This description of the relationship between faith and reason, 
rhetoric and epistemology is a sharp contrast to the prevailing liberal-humanist 
perspective that emerges from the tradition of Enlightenment rationality…a tradition that 
regards the mind as a kind of ‘calculating and assessing machine that is open to all 
thoughts and closed to none’… Fish contends however that the mind must begin with a 
first premise, a fixed commitment to a value or idea, and that this premise both enables 
thought about a subject at hand and is unavailable to thought precisely because it is 
thought’s enabling condition (Olson & Worsham, 2004, p.148). 
 
In other words, beliefs are a precondition of thought, of reason. Student teachers, it would seem, 
cannot be open-minded to beliefs which are hostile to the assumptions and beliefs from which their 
reasoning begins. Their beliefs constitute self rather than self or consciousness being separable from 
their belief. Student teachers cannot stand aside from their beliefs and convictions for they cannot by 
necessity be self-conscious of ideals that are themselves constitutive of their consciousness. That 
“would be tantamount to rising out of our own ideological perspective in order to examine that 
perspective from outside of itself” (Olson & Worsham, 2004, p.149).  This does not preclude a student 
teacher’s self-conscious and critical reflection upon their practice after the teaching event, but is to say 
that such critique will necessarily be within a discursive framework required to render the act and 
evaluation of teaching comprehensible. Other critics have further suggested that an insistence on 
making tacit understanding explicit may actually impede the development of student teachers’ 
teaching competence: 
There may be valid socio-political arguments for establishing a self-conscious 
professional rhetoric – to afford collective protection against government interference and 
attempts at ‘deprofessionalisation’, for example – but such considerations should not be 
confused with an implicit psychology of adult professional learning: ‘what works best’. It 
may be, for instance, that explicating and theorising one’s competence through discussion 
and reflection is a process that needs to come later in the course of professional 
development once considerable tacit expertise has been established, and that tutors and 
mentors who try to start the process too soon may impede the development of that very 
expertise (Atkinson & Claxton, 2000, p.3). 
 
Of course this throws doubt on the possibility of belief change at all. Whilst there are studies which 
attest to the transformative potential of student teachers’ beliefs (see for example, Segall, 2001; 
Goodwin 2002; Weber and Mitchell, 1996; and Levin, 2000), there are also those which suggest 
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students’ beliefs are extremely robust (Calderhead & Robson, 1991). The foregoing issues therefore 
raise two important questions in relation to understanding student teacher learning. Firstly, if all 
observation is framework-dependent, and therefore selective and partial, how might a student teacher 
observe any ‘fact’ which disconfirms their perspective?  How therefore is change possible? Secondly, 
if logic and order is given primacy over a student teacher’s particularised moral judgement (possibly 
refuting orthodox theory or the dominant discourse), how do we protect their judgements from the 
educational establishment’s assumption that these are merely the irrational prejudices of the 
inexperienced and naive?  
 
The pluralist critique: incommensurable rationalities? 
Life can be seen through many windows, none of them necessarily clear or opaque, less 
or more distorting than any of the others (Berlin, 2001, p.4). 
 
In answering these questions we might turn to those who claim that progress in knowledge occurs, not 
through rational analysis alone, but through contrast and pluralism (Berlin, 2001; Feyerabend, 1993; 
Fish, 1989; Foucault, 1980). Pluralist critiques claim that knowledge is not a set of theories aimed at 
convergence, eventual commensurability or one truth, but rather it is “an ever-increasing ocean of 
mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the 
collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of 
competition, to the development of our consciousness” (Feyerabend, 1993, p.21, original emphasis). In 
other words, the principle of consensus does not respect the creative potential of difference.  
According to Foucault (1980), there are always different discourses circulating simultaneously in any 
culture as well as overlapping discursive formations. Hence it might then be plausible to suggest that 
change is dependent upon the existence of a plurality of (partial and sometimes incompatible) 
discourses and irreconcilable desires which depend for their meaning upon their contrast or difference 
to other discourses. On this view, though change may be possible, it cannot be assumed that all 
students, potentially reasoning from different discursive formations at different times, will necessarily 
converge on a universal, timeless pre-specified outcome. Perhaps then the problem is not actually 
whether change occurs at all, but rather whether there can be a general theory of such change. The 
 13
literary theorist Fish (1989) for example, in writing about belief change, contends that change is a 
given since minds are ‘engines of change’. One’s beliefs are justified within a structure of beliefs 
through which the belief is made meaningful, and it is this which offers the possibility of change in 
belief as when one belief is brought to consciousness which conflicts with another belief in the face of 
a crisis or dilemma. Nevertheless, he contends that such shifts are contingent upon a person’s 
structures of belief and chance events. They cannot be engineered for we cannot know exactly what 
crisis, what moral dilemma, what set of circumstances will dislodge a belief and result in an internal 
restructuring of a belief system. In this respect, a change in beliefs is dependent not only upon chance 
events but also upon the socio-historical circumstances within which a teacher’s knowing is 
embedded. Change cannot be characterised as a predictable, linear convergence upon an understanding 
of best practice for all. Rather it is to say that alternative, competing theories or discourses are 
required if (interpreted) ‘empirical’ data refuting the student teachers’ original theory is to be available 
to perception. 
The claim here is that different, alternative and intuitive knowledges are not abnormalities to be 
remedied via reason but rather the very genesis of creative thought and piecemeal progress. As 
Thomas (1998) argues, pure rationalism hinders this creativity since it relegates untheorised, local, 
imaginative or embodied knowing (that which is only later accessible to formalisation). He traces the 
situatedness of thought and the fragmentary nature of knowledge to its roots as a strong theme running 
through the philosophical traditions of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Dewey and latterly through Feyerabend, 
Foucault and others. However, the forces of conservatism in education are considerable. Despite its 
association with creativity and progress, situated, partisan thinking is largely disparaged in education 
says Thomas, treated rather like a blemish threatening to deface the homogenization, impartiality and 
rational purity of established educational theory. 
Our argument thus far has been that the discourses of technical-rationalism and reflective teaching 
have become ‘naturalised’ in teacher education. They have acquired the authoritative claim to truth 
which occurs when the power struggle required to achieve their dominance has been obscured or 
forgotten. Thus, in what follows we wish to suggest that these discourses potentially foreclosed our 
students’ creativity and learning. In positioning ‘effectiveness’ solely as an evidence-based, rational or 
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commercial matter and thereby appearing to offer a ‘secure’ foundation for the making of pedagogical 
judgements, these discourses absolve new teachers from their responsibility for shaping and contesting 
practices, for acting upon ethical conviction and from the burden of acting without the a fail-safe ‘rule-
book’.  
 
Interrogating discourse in student accounts 
Educational research is, unavoidably, a rhetorical affair. Like any other texts, research 
texts – reports, articles, instruments – are ‘fabrications’. Their truths and findings are put 
together – that is, built or woven (depending on the sense of fabric that one prefers) to 
achieve particular effects and structures – rather than artlessly culled from a pre-existing 
world Out There……this is never an innocent business” (Maclure, 2003, p. 80).  
 
As Maclure (2003) notes above, constructionists would accept the validity of political, rather than 
realist (word-world correspondence), epistemological claims for their research. As we examine the 
accounts from our own student teachers below, the focus of analysis is therefore necessarily upon 
spoken discourse.9 Thus, we were interested in these texts as sites wherein social meanings are 
constituted, reproduced and contested. Constructionist discourse analysis is concerned with the 
discursive nature of educational realities (Maclure, 2003). We have collected a variety of textual 
material in our investigation of teacher education but for the purposes of this paper, we have drawn 
upon student accounts given in narrative-biographical, semi-structured interviews. We believed these 
provided us with the richest source of analytic material. Our research was conducted within our own 
institution, a teacher education programme in a university in the North-East of England10. The 
interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, thematically coded and analysed by the authors and was 
guided by our aim to explore how discursive devices constituted and shaped our students’ 
understandings of teaching and teacher identity. To this end, we investigated whether students drew 
upon commonly-shared discursive resources or what Potter and Wetherell (1987) refer to as 
‘interpretive repertoires.’  In our analysis, we also searched for patterns of variation (Tonkiss, 2004) 
or tensions, created by contrasts and contradictions within and between different discourses circulating 
and competing for supremacy. We also sought to identify silences, that is, where particular ways of 
talking about teaching were warranted or privileged over alternative accounts (Tonkiss, 2004).  
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I want to be a proper teacher but I want to do it my way: the discipline of ‘best practice’ 
One way in which our students’ creativity was disciplined was through a technicist discourse of ‘best 
practice’. Here, learning to teach was seen as a matter of scaling the ladder of competence to arrive at 
‘effective’ teaching. Significantly, truth was seen as a technical matter of correctness to unquestioned 
criteria:  
There are lots of students who want to be told exactly how to teach…A, B, C, D and 
that’s what they think they should get out of the university (male, mature entry student). 
 
…..with literacy and numeracy strategies it almost appears as if there is a right 
answer….(male student). 
 
When you don’t know anything about teaching you cling to the structure (of the literacy 
hour) …. because you feel that bit more comfortable when you go into the lesson 
knowing that at least you have a structure to follow….(female student). 
 
The word ‘cling’ used in the third extract is significant since it implies a need for steadfast safety 
mechanisms in a precarious world, an authoritative methodological crutch in the face of classroom 
complexity. We thus discerned in our students’ accounts a tendency to speak of a desire to control and 
entirely eliminate risk from teaching, and evade failure:  
In the school I’m in, the climate isn’t one where I’d feel safe to experiment with stuff…I 
think I’d just want to do things the way the teacher does them (female student). 
 
What’s hard is that you’ve got the responsibility of someone’s class…it’s not a trial and 
error situation where if you make a mistake it’s ok…(male, mature-entry student). 
 
When you go into … workshops you’re thinking ‘well it’s alright to think in a different 
way’ but I can’t help feeling that’s going to be the death of me because you know 
teachers will say ‘you’re different…you’re naïve…oh yes, I thought that when I came out 
of training school but you’ll soon see the light (male student). 
 
And the belief that ‘effective’ teaching is achieved by imitating exemplary practice appeared to 
guarantee students much desired security and status conferred by acceptance into an established 
profession: 
At this stage (in the course) there’s not a lot of room for creativity and if you did try to do 
things differently you’d be marked down for that and you wouldn’t pass the 
course…..(male, mature-entry student). 
 
Though the conservative tendency to seek the security of sanctioned techniques was prevalent in the 
accounts, there were also traces of disaffection associated with the restrictive penalties of such 
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technicism in relation to moral and educational purpose. It suppressed possibilities for the weaving of 
a different identity, for self-reliance and for creative pedagogy. Students’ accounts are thus marked 
with traces of competing truths and ambivalences reminiscent of both gain and loss. A mature-entry 
male student, for example, spoke frankly of what he called his need to ‘stick with what’s safe’ and yet 
he also voiced resistance to some institutional practices: 
If you’re asking me for the next 25 years to deliver structured literacy and numeracy 
lessons in a certain way then I will probably be one of the people in 5 years to drop out. 
 
 
And, though drawn to the comfort of compliance, he had also begun to note opportunities within 
competing and partial discourses to fashion an identity and pedagogy more in keeping with his view of 
himself as a creative and active social agent: 
…but yet in Professional Studies, there is a message that we can be ourselves and creative 
later on….they’re (tutors) making  us question how there isn’t just one approach....it’s 
one viewpoint - but it’s not the whole answer. 
 
One young female student had even begun to reassess the role of discontinuities and transgressions as 
potentially productive. In discussing her search to clarify her educational commitments, she had begun 
to note the constitutive potential of difference when discussing competing values with her peers in 
university seminars: 
…before I came on this course I didn’t think there was a role for teachers to criticise 
things…..I thought it would be quite radical you know……I didn’t think it would be so 
welcomed and celebrated…I like it….It made me a lot more critical and allowed me to 
stand back a little bit and think is that decision correct for me, you know, is that what I 
want? 
 
It is Graff’s contention (2004) that thinking is structured by conflict since it is through exposure to 
different beliefs that one’s own beliefs are clarified. This is not to claim that such exposure will 
eventually lead to a ‘universal synthesis’, for difference, as Derrida (1998) would claim, is constitutive 
of meaning. Graff suggests our aim should not be to “muffle conviction, but to bring it out into the 
open where as students and teachers we can better decide where our own convictions lie” (Graff, 2004, 
p.38).  In other words, a plurality of perspectives raises awareness that there might be more than one 
set of standards (and perhaps emergent ones) to which students might ascribe. 
Nonetheless, creativity and difference were overwhelmingly viewed as risky transgressions, 
potentially punishable deviancies, or irrationalities. Students were obliged to conform to what Ball 
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(cited in Woods and Jeffrey, 2004) calls ‘assigned social identities’ which confer the status of ‘proper 
teacher’. These are those identities imputed by others with the authority to judge competency. It was, 
for example, politically hazardous to contest officially sanctioned theory and practices: 
 
I think what comes through on government videos is that the ideal lesson is one where the 
kids are quiet and put their hands up but when we go into lessons we see that’s not 
happening …and you want a bit of reality. It’s a dilemma, a political one…you know… if 
I don’t play the game then I get bad marks (male student). 
 
The trouble with the discourse of evidence-based ‘best practice’ is that it implies an ‘applied science’ 
of professionalism that precludes the impassioned engagement which Foucault would argue is 
necessary for change. Technicism promises to relieve students of the burdensome responsibility of 
engaging in the risky, political and imaginative struggle to make and remake realities (Maclure, 2003).  
This danger applies also to educational theory. The suggestion that theory can be straightforwardly 
applied to practice is powerfully authoritarian and conservative. For theory, rather than guiding 
practice from the outside, must arise out of social practice as alternative, partial stories told about 
classrooms compete in action. Britzman (2003, p.69), for example, in her study of preservice teachers’ 
learning, contends that theorising is not “an imposition of abstract theories upon vacuous conditions. 
Theorising is a form of engagement with and intervention in the world.” In this sense, teachers talk 
and enact institutions, practices and realities into being (Heritage, 1984) and social realities are 
therefore political, and creative accomplishments as communities engage in the political process of 
negotiation through intentional action. ‘Realities’ are created and continuously reconstructed as “the 
oldest of truths are to some extent remade” (Dewey, 1907, p.74). As Thomas (1997) points out, it 
would be better to call the patterns we construct through insider experience within a social practice, 
generalisations rather than ‘theory’. The common academic or official view of theory as grand truths 
unencumbered by practice, politics or moral predilection, may be detrimental to our students’ 
creativity if they perceive loyalty to theory a substitute for judgement11. Judgement requires an 
assessment of each context as it presents itself to us and theory cannot override this and tell us what to 
do. The danger with discourses claiming to have prespecified the theory or the best practice for all, or 
to have defined the boundaries of rational exchange within inflexible standards of success, is that they 
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discourage students’ willingness to engage in the ongoing social creation and negotiation of teaching 
practices.  Their own judgement may be disregarded in the quest to comply with perceived mainstream 
teaching and educational research practices and standards. That is to say that “to use only tried and 
tested methods contributes at best to sclerosis in thinking; at worst, it traps students and researchers of 
education in the methods – and indeed the minds – of others” (Thomas, 1998, p.152).  
A further disturbing possibility is that some students, finding themselves at odds with officially-
sanctioned practices, may attribute this to their own inadequacy. Despite valuing the opportunity to 
engage in debate, students also spoke of a hope that conflict, rather than being constitutive, could be 
eradicable and that their future as ‘real’ teachers would be vested with (as yet absent) power to 
determine their pedagogies:  
There’s an overall way of teaching which we have to demonstrate in order to pass the 
course and then what you do after that it’s kind of up to you and that’s when you become 
a real teacher….once you’re established in a school they’ll value you as an individual 
(male, mature-entry student). 
 
They’re (the National Curriculum and policy directives) restrictive yes…but it’s good for 
students coming out of PGCE and hopefully we won’t be that restricted later when you’re 
more experienced and confident (female student). 
 
Thus, students spoke of conflict and difference as a temporary deviation from the norm rather than the 
means by which professional identities and practices are continually (re)constructed. In the current 
policy climate of technicist solutions, commensurability and scientifically determined, standardised 
‘best practice’, we view such hopes as threats to the future of creative education as we see it. 
 
I should be coherent but I’m living with inconsistency: the discipline of rationalism 
Another discourse associated with the disciplining of our students’ creativity is that of rationalism. 
Here, order, consistency and logic are privileged over, and prior to, conviction. Thus, there was a 
belief that ‘reflective practice’ could bring relief from the burden of moral dilemmas and 
indeterminate situations by assisting one in adjudicating confidently between incommensurable 
values. One student, for example, found himself questioning his allegiance to behaviourism after 
reading Kohn’s Punished by Rewards (Kohn, 1999):  
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(The book is) kind of an alternative view to the popular behaviour model and it’s one of 
the most thought-provoking books I’ve ever read because it challenged all the things I’m 
seeing and doing (male mature-entry student). 
 
He recognised a shift in practice would come at a price. Yet, rather than tolerate such loss, there was 
an expectation that the matter of competing, incommensurate ‘goods’ (between his desire to cultivate 
intrinsic motivation and his desire to confer praise) should be amenable to reasonable resolution: 
I don’t agree with giving people stickers to do something that they should do anyway 
because eventually they’ll lose the will to do it…because they’ll do it for the sticker and 
not because they want to do it….having said that in my own life I do that…I praise 
somebody because you quite like the behaviour that they’ve showed and you’re actually 
doing what you’re not agreeing with…so I’m getting all kind of…there’s a conflict there 
and we don’t do enough on this course to understand these conflicts. 
 
Another student found irreconcilable conflicts haunting her decisions and her reflections and appeared 
to believe that this contradiction in thought and practice must inevitably condemn one to failure: 
…I had come to the point where I realised I had totally contradicted myself and I thought 
‘I’m going to fail’. …. that’s very, very scary because you’re just one teacher in a big sea 
and there’s so many issues that contradict each other and what I found is that I had my 
own ideas but that they were contradictory to each other and how can you achieve one 
whilst trying to achieve the other…..? (female student). 
 
There are too many competing conceptions of improvement in education to allow smooth progress 
towards untroubled clarity in the face of indeterminate situations. We agree with Brown and Jones 
(2001, p.163) that agency is not that “..which can be found embedded within the ‘grand narrative’ of 
human liberation which is premised on and fortified by belief in the coherent and autonomous 
individual. Nor is it found within communicative action where individuals, by engaging in ideal, 
transparent speech acts can seek to avoid relations of power”. Whilst we would not wish to devalue 
reflection on practice nor educational dialogue in the process of learning to teach, we remain 
concerned if these become reified goods, ends justified in themselves, for then there is a danger that 
they become rigid methodologies which inhibit the strength of conviction needed for making difficult 
judgements in action. It is particularly important that students do not feel that conflict is a taboo to be 
repressed or eradicated. Rationalism assumes that ethical decisions can be reached unequivocally by 
appeal to univalent principles, appeals to reason, or notions of ‘best practice’. This denies the ongoing 
political, discursive constitution and reconstitution of identities and practices. We are troubled by the 
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assumption of convergence, the expectation that it should be possible to meet all priorities or that the 
principled application of one, consistent truth to all particular cases is necessarily advantageous.  
 
I know what I want but I’m not sure: the discipline of certainty 
The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (Wittgenstein, cited in Blake et al, 
2000, p.195). 
 
Wittgenstein’s work draws our attention to the alarming absence of foundation, common standards or 
ultimate justification for our daily decision-making and actions. His suggestion is that, in the face of 
incommensurable values and provisional solutions, we must not resort to a paralysing doubting of 
everything; rather we must yet engage with a dynamic world and act on our present convictions, 
beliefs and intentions as they present themselves to us in the immediate contexts of action.   
Foundationalist discourses, by contrast, are dissatisfied with a lack of solid ground to stand on. They  
revere the non-contradictory, unified self, and relegate the hybrid, contingent self to a position of lack. 
They confer blame upon student teachers for contradiction and inconsistency and imply a need on the 
part of the student to eliminate such pathologies permanently, positioning “uncertainty as both a 
character flaw and a problem of management that can be solved by what inheres in the person” 
(Britzman, 2003, p.225). They deny “the power relationships that shape classroom life” (Britzman, 
2003, p.225) and hence the potential of power as a catalyst for new learning is lost since it is assumed 
that learning is an affair which can be understood once-and-for-all rather than an ongoing struggle. 
The third source of discipline we identified in our students’ accounts then, was a belief that ignorance, 
partiality and doubt are pathological afflictions to be eradicated by appeals to authority: 
The nature of being in a classroom is that you want to be reassured that what you’re doing 
is right….not going in blind …so you can be sure you know the answers before you go 
in……you have to have someone telling you where you’re going wrong and where you’re 
going right to check you’re on the right track. I wouldn’t feel confident to criticise; I’m 
too new (female student). 
 
Whilst we would concur with those who suggest that teachers can learn much from experienced 
mentors (Day, 1999), we are concerned by this student’s belief that mentors (or indeed researchers, 
tutors and policy-makers) have the means for telling her what to do, for “educational research can only 
ever show us what has been possible in a specific situation – even if that situation was the specific 
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situation of something called a ‘representative sample’ – but it can never tell us once and for all what 
to do” (Burbules and Biesta, 2004, p.110). Educational knowledge, the product of educational enquiry, 
cannot alleviate us from the responsibility of deciding the moral thing to do. 
Moreover, we found guilty admissions of partiality, ignorance and error, as if the risk of uncertainty 
constituted a lack in them, or a difficulty to be overcome through concealment: 
…..as long as teaching placements are pass or fail, you’re not going to get people taking 
risks…they’re going to do it anonymously because there’s a fear of failure (male student). 
 
I find all these theories hard…I don’t think I’m very good at it…I get confused about all 
the theories but it’s just my ignorance I think…(female student). 
 
I don’t have confidence in my own opinions because it’s all new to me…you’re so used 
to people saying you should think this way or you should be learning this and it’s hard to 
get out of that…..so I probably don’t look at things as critically as I should but I go along 
with it (female student). 
 
More disturbing was the assumed possibility of overcoming ignorance by dogged persistence and a 
professed ‘openness to everything’: 
…you’ve got to be open to everything and not be small-minded….you’ve got to be aware 
of your limitations…you’ve got to be open to everything (female student). 
 
You need to have humility with people because I think you’d be an ignorant person if you 
didn’t take on other people’s ideas (female student). 
 
This open-mindedness was not tempered with the understanding that it cannot eliminate partiality 
from one’s judgement or reconcile the incommensurable values and competing obligations that often 
characterise pedagogic encounters. That is, there was no acknowledgement that, since one cannot do 
everything, one has to take a stand about what it is best to do, or that it is only through our knowing to 
what we are opposed that our own convictions achieve clarity. Our concern as teacher educators then 
is that discourses of certainty suggest to students that open-mindedness provides a means of finally 
grasping the truth, the complete solution.  If this chimera remains beyond reach, it may lead instead to 
self-blame or the blaming of others:  
….people get really scared when you (the tutor) don’t give them the answer and it’ll 
probably come back as negative feedback on your (university) evaluations…(male, 
mature-entry  student). 
 
We would suggest that teaching is always characterised by the need to act with some personal 
conviction in the face of uncertainty. It is always to some extent an enquiry, irresolvable in any 
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absolute or ‘once-and-for-all’ way. Without such striving and difficulty there is no concomitant delight 
in accomplishment, no feeling of having achieved something by virtue of one’s own efforts. Yet as 
Blake et al (2000, p.205) note, “Ignorance is seen today as just a lack, a gap to be filled in, a debility to 
be cured.” They go on to root such disparagement in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment discourse 
captured in both progressive and conservative educational traditions. Without teacher educators’ faith 
in their new teachers’ creative potential, in their capacity to go beyond what is already established, the 
possibility of expanding pedagogic possibilities in the future is foreclosed. As one student commented: 
We’re all self-doubting and you need others to have faith in you …I know I’m confident 
in myself but I worry if someone says I can’t do it and I don’t want anyone having that 
judgement on me …..it should be me making that judgement (male, mature-entry 
student). 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that social practices such as teaching produce meaning, and that 
meanings, in turn, fashion teachers’ conduct. From a constructionist perspective, since nothing has 
meaning outside of discourse, practices are always discursively regulated but also potentially 
transformed.  Thus practices are both dynamic and infused with relations of power. Teachers’ learning 
is not therefore an ahistorical and dispassionate matter. The ‘truth’ about education or about teachers’ 
or pupils’ learning is that which has competed for, and achieved, pre-eminence through a political 
process. We are concerned that the discourses of technicism and reflective teaching are conservative, 
an effect which has come about through their naturalisation. The creative and political struggle 
necessary to their eventual success has been obscured or overlooked. Our argument in this paper has 
been that such conservatism is detrimental to new teachers’ creative spirit.  We are concerned that 
authoritative discourses which purport to provide reliable foundations (timeless, acultural rule-books) 
absolve students from the moral responsibility and decisive conviction necessary for shaping 
education. Whilst such discourses may provide welcome respite from provisionality and insecurity for 
vulnerable new teachers, they also deny them their role in the political process of accomplishing the 
meanings and practices of education. Though reflective practice does demand that students think 
critically about official definitions of good practice in relation to their educational aims and context, 
the social milieu in which they learn is nevertheless infused with status and power
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and careers all too often hinge on how successfully they uphold the legitimated official discourse of 
standards or the authoritative theoretical accounts of researchers. Reliance upon foundations therefore 
leads to dependency, inflexibility and a restrictive, one-dimensional view of educational standards. 
Our argument is therefore that creative change is unlikely to occur through rational exchange alone. 
We have argued that possibilities for change are dependent upon the availability of multiple, 
competing perspectives of teacher identity and practice. Yet our students found risk-taking injudicious 
in the face of policies which pathologise transgression and inventiveness. Foucault’s analytics of 
power point to the techniques which serve to regulate subjects (Foucault, 1977) and is germane here. 
One of these techniques is ‘normalization’ wherein the beliefs, actions and values of those failing to 
conform to the standard designated as normal are characterised as deviant. As Blake et al (2000) 
comment, creative possibilities are then diminished. For standards become one-dimensional and 
contestable only to the extent that their realization has or has not been accomplished: 
A standard, we should recall, is in one of its meanings a single scale, like Celsius or 
Richter, on which all temperatures and earthquakes can be ranked. The standard, and thus 
the goals and values, are one and the same for all. (All that is, must be commensurable.) 
Absurd to object that you were trying to do something different with your pupils or 
students… (Blake et al, 2000, p.xi).  
 
As Feyerabend (1993) notes, rational exchange is different to open exchange. Rational exchange 
restricts debate in terms of pre-established standards whereas open exchange offers potential for 
change not dependent upon logic but rather upon the irrational, the contingent, the imaginative and the 
play of contrast and difference. Of course this precludes the possibility of complete solutions. All 
situated judgements entail the juggling of competing priorities. Change is not predictable for it is 
neither amenable to the rational technology of control nor to an Enlightened state of liberation from 
competing, incommensurable obligations. But if our students are led to expect such totality, we should 
not then be surprised when this leads to disappointment, disaffection and a culture of blame.  
Rather than expecting liberation from ideological distortion, they should, however, expect an 
opportunity to argue for their position on substantive educational matters (such as the need to act on a 
conviction in the teaching moment) whilst also being allowed the possibility of adaptation to changing 
circumstances across time and space. We are arguing in this paper for practical, inventive (rather than 
merely rational) enquiry. This does not mean being wholly indiscriminate since that would militate 
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against the conviction needed to act, to test ideas, to take risks. The very notion of risk-taking entails a 
belief that not all outcomes are equally worthy. Such aspirations do “not imply an abrogation of 
thought about educational problems; rather it implies a plea for such thought not to be constrained 
within parameters of particular kinds of theory and putatively rational enquiry. It implies an 
encouragement of the student’s and the researcher’s unrestrained intelligence so that they do whatever 
seems best – not what is implied by some theory, or what is consistent with some existing body of 
knowledge” (Thomas, 1998, p.156). This requires a climate wherein student teachers’ roles as creative 
knowledge producers is recognised (Day, 2004; Edwards, 2001), where practice may lead to 
unplanned yet nonetheless fruitful inventions and solutions. These are conditions within which student 
teachers’ enquiries may grow in unpredictable, as yet unprecedented, directions for practice.   
Ultimately this is a question of trust, and belief in the moral and creative capacities of our students. 
Educational practice may progress but this requires that new teachers possess the political courage and 
creative will to make it happen.  We have argued in this paper that we ought to liberate such courage 
in our student teachers so that they, in their turn, may liberate such courage in their pupils. As 
Nietzsche asserted, imagination and responsibility are central features of personal development 
through education: 
If we are not accountable…we shall wander the world seeking someone to explain 
ourselves to, someone to absolve us and tell us we have done well (Nietzsche, cited in 
Blake et al, 2000, p. 227). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Behler, E (1986) for a discussion of Kant’s views on the impossible art of educating. 
2
 A vast literature in philosophy, the social sciences and education deals with the socially constructed nature of 
identity. When we talk of identity in this paper we refer to self-identity by which we mean the ways we 
conceptualise our subjective self, and social identity, by which we mean the ways we are conceptualised by 
others. In particular, we draw upon a post-structuralist perspective on the human subject. Here the subject is not 
thought of as unified, autonomous or stable with fixed attributes but emerges relationally, constituted within and 
across a range of discourses (see Sarup, 1988; Peters, 1998). When we refer to professional or teacher identity, 
we include both social and self-identity in that we understand teacher identity to be influenced both by the 
conceptions, images and expectations in society about what a teacher should be like, and also what a teacher 
believes to be important to their work based on their values, experiences and beliefs (Beijaard et al, 2004).  
3
 For a discussion of the dominance of rationalism in educationalists’ thinking generally and the unhappy 
consequences for creativity in education to which it leads, see Thomas (1997;1998). 
4
 We refer here to critiques of all ahistorical foundations for knowledge, a theme running through Western 
philosophy, particularly  in the work of post-Nietzchean European thought and American neopragmatism.  
5
 Rorty (1998), for example, has named the assumption that our language corresponds with reality as ‘the 
correspondence theory of truth’ and offers a neopragmatist alternative wherein language acts as a tool to meet 
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our purposes rather than as a mirror on the world. This is not a rejection of realism as such but a critique of the 
reality-scheme distinction. See also Dewey’s transactional realism which understands experience itself as 
constituting reality in that our understanding of the world is always already implicated in meaning arising out of 
action and we cannot therefore ‘check’ our knowledge agrees with a pre-existent, uninterpreted, given reality 
(Dewey, 1958).  
6
 See Thomas (1997) for a discussion of how the authority vested in psychological theory - for example, the 
proclaimed essentialist nature of children’s cognition - has influenced teacher education negatively.  
7
 In spite of recurrent warnings about the role the education system currently plays in increasing the gap between 
affluent and poor families in relation to access to and the benefits of education, there are those who argue that 
teachers’ decisions are nevertheless heavily regulated by policed mechanisms in which the penalties of acting on 
different interpretations of ‘equality of opportunity’ if they so desired are too severe to warrant non-compliance 
as a worthwhile option. See for example, Ball (2003).  
8
 This could be referred to as naïve realism, an epistemology related to positivism. However, we accept that there 
are a range of realist positions which are more complex, such as scientific realism for example which has 
attempted to deal with criticisms aimed at assumptions of theory-free observation. A fuller discussion is given by 
Scheurich (1997).  
9
 In traditional, modernist notions of research, validity relates to the extent to which findings correspond to the 
way things are in reality. Yet this conception is based upon a correspondence theory of truth and an 
epistemology which, as discussed above, is problematic. The postmodern, pluralist turn suggests that there are 
different ways of storying the same events (Huttunen et al, 2002). This is not unbridled relativism or 
subjectivism for, when seen within a pragmatist account of knowledge, all knowledge is still nevertheless 
meaningful only within the social or discursive practices of particular socio-historical contexts.  
10
 The research in this paper draws on interviews with ten students carried out in the university department, but 
in order to illustrate key aspects of our argument in detail we draw in particular on three students who were 
interviewed at the beginning and end of their post-graduate certificate in education programme. Interviewees 
comprised a mature-entry, white British, male student  (34) who had previously spent several years in retail 
management, a young, white British male student (22) who had come into teaching straight from his first degree 
in geography, and a young, white British female student (22), also straight from her first degree in English. 
Though we have been rigorous in our analyses, we do not claim realist validity for the use of their accounts here. 
In recent years, there have been moves to reclaim the ‘authentic’ voice of teachers in educational research in an 
attempt to minimise ‘distortion’ and correct the privileging of the researcher’s view. However, Maclure (2003) 
and Scheurich (1997) argue that aspirations to liberate the authentic representations of interviewees (as opposed 
to ‘insincere fronts’), assumes a binary universe of realism with the concomitant metaphors of applied science. 
Maclure suggests instead that life-history researchers and their subjects produce (always incomplete) texts as 
part of the unceasing construction of social reality. Research is thus generative rather than representational.  
11
 This is not to deny, as stated elsewhere in the paper, that making practice amenable to self-conscious reflection 
and engaging in rational exchange, may be helpful for students as they participate in the socio-political process 
of debating educational issues.  
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